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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1986 at the first ISSA Conference in Amsterdam, straight off a plane from Australia, 
Michael Scriven gave an invited lecture entitled “Probative Logic,” rendered with that 
speaker’s customary exuberant intelligence and stentorian disapproval of the laggardly 
and unreflexively orthodox. It was an outstanding performance, one of the first 
articulations within the CT/IL community of the analytical forces that were gathering 
unruly strength in computer science artificial intelligence. As far as I can tell, Michael 
gave voice to these ideas on his own and without direct contact with the various 
developments in default logics, systems of nonmonotonic reasoning, defeasible 
inheritance logics, autoepistemic and abductive logics, circumspection logics, truth-
maintenance systems, theory update logics, preferential reasoning logics, to say nothing 
of logic programming and the likes of Prolog. 
The main idea of the Amsterdam talk was that the establishment paradigms came 
nowhere close to covering the reach of human reasoning; that beyond the narrow confines 
of the logics of deduction and statistico-experimental induction, there is an incipient third 
logic directed to the various kinds of reasoning that rightfully deliver their conclusions 
with something less than deductive tightness or—in the technical sense of the term—
inductive strength. What was especially valuable about Michael’s proposal was his 
insistence that there was nothing subpar or second-or third-best about this third type of 
reasoning, that it too had “the quality or function of proving or demonstrating” a 
conclusion (hence the name “probative). It is a striking idea, largely because it could 
possibly be true if “proving” and “demonstrating” are given the senses imposed on them 
by the mainstream logics. What Michael was saying is, in effect, that mainstream logic 
had high-jacked the notions of proof and demonstration. In his, we can only be reminded 
of Stephen Toulmin, who levelled the same charge against the appropriation of the 
idioms of probability by purveyors of the applied mathematics of games of chance.  
It is easy to see the appeal that Michael’s talk would have had for the Amsterdam 
conferees. For weren’t they, too, of the view that the analysis of human reasoning was too 
much to ask of the deductive and inductive paradigms? Since Amsterdam, a certain 
picture of how best to proceed with the theory of reasoning—whether deductive, 
inductive or probative—has emerged. It is the way of the systematic analysis of 
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argument. But this was not Scriven’s way in 1986 and it is not Scriven’s way now. 
Scriven is a probative logician but he is not an argumentation theorist, except 
intermittently, that is to say, in those particular cases in which reasoning is intrinsically 
argumentative. This sets up an interesting question. How, if you are not an argumentation 
theorist, is the theory of probative reasoning to be done? And where, these twenty-three 
years later, is this probative logic or this family of probative logics to be found?  
Concerning the second of these questions, let my quickly dispose of a not 
altogether unnatural suggestion. Given that “there is still a burgeoning industry in AI 
studying nonmonotonic logic [and the like],”1 why not turn to AI for our probative logic? 
I daresay that Michael would like John Pollock’s response to this suggestion. 
 
Unfortunately, their lack of philosophical training led AI researchers to produce accounts that 
were mathematically sophisticated, but epistemologically naïve. Their theories could not 
accommodate the varieties of defeasible reasoning humans actually imply [] [T]his coming 
remains to the present day.2  
 
 What, then, of the first question. What would (or should) a non-argumentative 
probative logic look like? What are its chief analytically constitutive features? This is a 
tough question subsuming a large task. In the time available to me it is not possible to 
take it on. So let me confine myself to a smaller question. What analytically constitutive 
features of a probative logic have been introduced and/or developed by Michael Scriven? 
(After all, it is twenty-three years later). Pleading again the press of time, I’ll deal with 
just two of them. They are 
 
 The concept of normic or generic propositions. 
 The concept of selection-explanation or inference to the best explanation. 
 
2. NORMICITY 
 
Michael has spent the lion’s share of his intellectual life doing battle against orthodoxies 
that had got too big for their britches. In 1959, he took baleful issue with the received 
view of generalization and general propositions.3 Generality lies at the heart of human 
reasoning, where so much of what we’re up to is generalizing to and instantiating from 
general propositions. As briefly as I can put it, Michael noticed that both science and 
everyday life are replete with general propositions having neither the logical form nor 
semantic profile mandated for them by the orthodoxy. Consider, for example, “Ocelots 
are four-legged.”4 Perhaps its most distinctive semantic feature is that there are true 
negative instances in the face of which it remains true (say, that Ozzie the ocelot is only 
three-legged). Accordingly, it is not a universally quantified conditional statement. It is of 
a different logical form.  
                                                 
1 John Pollock, “Defeasible reasoning.” In: J. Adler and L. Rips (Eds.), Reasoning: Studies in human 
inference and its foundations. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008 p. 452.  
2 John Pollock, “Defeasible reasoning” p. 452. 
3 Michael Scriven, “Truisms as the grounds for historical explanations.” In: P. Gardiner (Ed.), Theories of 
History, pp. 443-475. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1959. 
4 Earlier recognition to the same effect was Cooper Langford’s “The institutional use of ‘the,’” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 10 (1949), 115-120. 
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What is the significance of this for human reasoning? Consider the case at hand. 
Given that ocelots are four-legged and Ozzie is an ocelot there is a correct default 
inference for you to draw. It is that Ozzie is four-legged. But, as you now see, Ozzie is 
three-legged. If the general premises had been a universally quantified conditional 
statement, you would have made two mistakes. You would have been wrong about Ozzie 
and you would have been wrong about ocelots. But since the general premise is in fact a 
normic proposition, you have made only one mistake. You were wrong about Ozzie but 
you were right about ocelots. The economics of this set-up speak for themselves and they 
lend weight to a further normic generalization, which is that 
 
By and large, human reasoners generalize to and instantiate from normic 
propositions, not universally quantified ones. 
 
This is not expressly in “Truisms as the grounds for historical explanations” but it is 
certainly incipiently present. I regard it as a discovery of the first importance for the logic 
of human reasoning. 
 
3. SELECTION-EXPLANATION 
 
Selection-explanation has a longer pedigree than normicity, occurring in Michael’s D. 
Phil. Thesis of 1956. Perhaps it is not precisely what Gil Harman was on about nine years 
later in his “The inference to the best explanation,”5 but it is a near thing all the same, 
something undoubtedly in the same family. Another piece of orthodoxy that Michael was 
doing battle with was the deductive-nomological model of explanation. But there is also a 
related issue, itself somewhat contentious as to whether or not evidential force is truth-
indicating. (Damn, I was nearly going to say “probative”!). Consider this rather coarse-
grained schema of a selection-explanation inference: 
 
1. The orbit of Mercury is perturbatious. 
 
If it were true that a planet—call it Vulcan—existed unseen at such and such place in the 
heavens, then this would explain Mercury’s orbital perturbations. 
 
2. So, let us provisionally make of Vulcan a working hypothesis. 
 
There are two points of importance to notice here. One is that it doesn’t matter for the 
tenability of this reasoning whether explanatory force is or is not truth-tracking or 
“evidentially clinching” (Geoff Goddu). What the schema relies on is merely the 
subjunctive claim that if Vulcan were to exist, it would explain the perturbations. It does 
not say, and need not say, that Vulcan does explain them. The other point of interest is 
that the conclusion is not probative in Michael’s preferred sense, which is meaning 
number two of his New Oxford American Dictionary. The premises don’t have “the 
quality or function of proving” that Vulcan exists. Rather, they have “the quality or 
function of rendering the Vulcan hypothesis worthy of exploration, that is, exploration on 
                                                 
5 Philosophical Review, 74 (1965) 88-95. 
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sufferance. And this, according to Michael’s dictionary, is the first meaning of 
“probative”—“exploratory.”  
Abduction—which is the generalization of selection-explanation inference—is as 
least as central to human reasoning as generalization. Michael’s anticipation of its 
structure well over a half-century ago is a large achievement. And if, in later years, he 
misnamed it as “probative,” it is only the slightest of errors. For the name is right; it is 
only is primary sense that requires reinstatement.  
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